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Are We Luminous? 
 
ABSTRACT: Since its appearance over a decade ago, Timothy Williamson’s anti-
luminosity argument has come under sustained attack. Defenders of the luminous 
overwhelmingly object to the argument’s use of a certain margin-for-error premise. 
Williamson himself claims that the premise follows easily from a safety condition on 
knowledge together with his description of the thought experiment. But luminists 
argue that this is not so: the margin-for-error premise either requires an implausible 
interpretation of the safety requirement on knowledge, or it requires other equally 
implausible (and soritical) assumptions. In this paper I bolster the margin-for-error 
premise against these attacks by recasting Williamson’s own two-part defence, the 
first intended to work on the assumption that there is no constitutive connection 
between the phenomenal and the doxastic, and the second intended to work without 
this assumption. Pace various luminists, I argue that the appeals to safety needed for 
Williamson’s two-part defence (the first in terms of outright belief, the second in 
terms of degrees of confidence) are plausible. I also argue that all that is needed to 
generate the margin-for-error premise from these safety conditions is an empirical 
assumption about the kinds of creatures we are: that is, creatures whose beliefs are 
structured by certain dispositions. By recasting the anti-luminosity argument in this 
way, we can understand what is really at stake in the debate about luminosity: that 
is, whether we are luminous. 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
In Knowledge and Its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that there are no non-trivial 
luminous conditions, where a condition is luminous just in case whenever one is in it, one 
is in a position to know one is in it (2000, chp. 4). If Williamson is right, then the common 
picture of the phenomenal realm as one of privileged access turns out to be a Cartesian 
orthodoxy from which philosophy must be cleansed. It also follows that rationality, 
evidence, normative obligations, and sameness of meaning – phenomena associated, for 
many, with privileged first-person access – are themselves non-luminous. 
 
Given its potential to destabilise, it is little wonder that the anti-luminosity argument has 
come under fire since its appearance. Luminists typically attack Williamson’s use of a 
certain margin-for-error premise.  Williamson himself claims that the premise follows easily 
from a safety condition on knowledge together with his description of the thought 
experiment. But luminists argue that this is not so: the margin-for-error premise either 
requires an implausible interpretation of the safety requirement on knowledge, or it 
requires a plausible interpretation of the safety requirement together with other 
implausible, often soritical, assumptions (Weatherson 2004; Blackson 2007; Wong 2008; 
Berker 2008; Ramachandran 2009; Vogel 2010; Cohen 2010; Zardini forthcoming). Either 
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way, the margin-for-error premise, and thus the anti-luminosity argument, is in trouble. 
Luminists counsel that we dismiss Williamson’s argument and cleave to the luminous. 
 
I shall argue that Williamson’s controversial margin-for-error premise, pace the luminists, 
can be derived from a plausible safety condition on knowledge1 together with a plausible 
empirical hypothesis about the kind of creatures we are – creatures, namely, whose beliefs 
are structured by certain kinds of dispositions. Indeed, I shall make this argument twice 
over. This is because some luminists have been keen to argue that the margin-for-error 
premise is particularly problematic on any view that maintains a constitutive connection 
between the phenomenal and the doxastic. So I will first argue for the margin-for-error 
premise from safety and empirical considerations on the assumption that no such 
constitutive connection obtains. I will then make a more refined argument that dispenses 
with that assumption: that is, an argument that applies to all (non-trivial) phenomenal 
conditions regardless of any constitutive connection that might obtain between them and 
beliefs about whether they obtain. In so doing, I hope to show the anti-luminosity 
argument to be robust against some of the most common criticisms. I also hope to show 
that a large part of what is at stake in the debate about anti-luminosity is a certain vision 
of what kind of creatures we are, empirically speaking.  
 
 2. The Anti-Luminosity Argument 
 
Williamson aims to establish that, for almost any condition2, it is possible for a normal 
human to be in that condition and fail to be in a position to know that she is in it3. He 
attempts to do this by producing a counterexample to the putative luminosity of the 
                                                        
1 I won’t be addressing those luminists who reject safety wholesale (Brueckner & Fiocco 2002; 
Neta & Rohrbaugh 2004; Comesaña 2005; Conee 200), only those who accept a safety condition 
on knowledge while objecting to the particular versions of it (putatively) needed for Williamson’s 
argument. 
2 Williamson notes that some conditions might not be susceptible to his anti-luminosity argument; 
such conditions might be trivially luminous. For example, conditions that never obtain are 
vacuously luminous, and conditions that always obtain might be luminous (when presented in 
certain guises). Williamson’s argument also does not work against eternal conditions, which always 
obtain if they ever obtain, though he gestures at an argument that shows that even such conditions 
are not plausibly luminous (2000, p. 108). Williamson’s central point is not that there could be no 
luminous conditions, but rather that luminous conditions, if they exist, are “curiosities” (ibid, p. 
109). Those conditions that we think of as paradigmatically luminous – e.g. being in pain, feeling 
cold, having a desire to phi, its appearing that p – are, if Williamson is correct, non-luminous.  
3 That is, it is possible for her to introspect as assiduously as possible without thereby coming to 
know that she is in the condition.  
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condition of feeling cold – a condition that, for many at least, seems paradigmatically 
luminous. Since analogous thought experiments can be produced for any other putatively 
luminous (non-trivial) condition, the anti-luminosity argument should generalise to all 
(non-trivial) conditions. Here is the thought experiment4: 
 
Cold Morning. S wakes up at dawn feeling freezing, very slowly warms up, 
and feels hot by noon. Throughout the morning S is concentrating 
sufficiently hard on the question of whether she feels cold, such that if she is 
in a position to know that she feels cold then she does indeed know. S’s 
powers of discrimination are limited, and the change from S’s feeling cold to 
hot is so gradual that S “is not aware of any change in them over one 
millisecond” (Williamson 2000, p. 97). S’s confidence that she feels cold 
gradually diminishes, such that by noon she firmly believes that she no longer 
feels cold. 
 
Let t0, t1, t2…tn be a series of times at one-millisecond intervals from dawn to noon. Let αi 
be the case5 at time ti. Let C be the condition that S feels cold, and K(C) the condition that S 
knows that C obtains. 
 
Now, let us assume that C is a luminous condition for S. That is, whenever S is in C, she 
is in a position to know she is in C. By the description of Cold Morning, whenever S is in 
a position to know that C obtains, she does in fact know that C obtains. Thus we have: 
 
 (LUM)  If C obtains in αi then K(C) obtains in αi  
 
Williamson then introduces the following margin-for-error principle, which he claims falls 
out of a simple safety condition on knowledge together with the description of the Cold 
Morning: 
 
 (MAR)6 If K(C) obtains in αi then C obtains in αi+1  
                                                        
4 This is my description of the thought experiment, though it is similar to Williamson’s original. 
5 A ‘case’ is a centred possible world – that is, a possible world with a designated subject and 
time. 
6 There is no standard presentation of Williamson’s argument in the literature, so (MAR), or its 
analogues in terms of possible worlds and times (rather than in the terminology of world-bound 
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By the description of Cold Morning, at dawn S feels cold, and at noon she no longer feels 
cold. So we have: 
 
 (BEG)  C obtains in α0 
 (END) C does not obtain in αn  
 
(LUM), (MAR), (BEG) and (END) are together incompatible. By (LUM), if C obtains in 
α0, then S knows that C obtains in α0. By (MAR), if S knows that C obtains in α0, then C 
obtains in α1. By (BEG), C does obtain in α0; therefore, C obtains in α1. Similarly, we can 
establish that C also obtains in α2, α3, α4, α5…αn. So C obtains in αn. But according to 
(END) C doesn’t obtain in αn. Thus we arrive at a contradiction7. 
 
 3. The problem with (MAR) 
 
Since (BEG) and (END) simply follow from the description of COLD MORNING, it 
seems we must either give up (MAR) or (LUM). Williamson counsels that we hold onto 
(MAR) and reject (LUM) – which is to say, abandon luminosity. Luminists, however, think 
that the lesson to be learned is that we should be suspicious of (MAR). But on what 
grounds?  
 
Wong (2008) argues that (MAR) is derivable from the following two premises: (1) If in αi 
one knows that one feels cold, then in αi one feels cold, and (2) If in αi one feels cold, then 
in αi+1 one feels cold. (1) follows uncontroversially from the factivity of knowledge, but (2) 
is of course soritical. Thus Wong concludes that (MAR) is itself soritical and should be 
rejected in favour of (LUM). But Wong is wrong to think that this obviously soritical 
argument is the only way to defend (MAR). In particular, Wong’s defence of (MAR) does 
not appeal to a safety condition on knowledge, which Williamson clearly intends to be part 
of the justification for (MAR). 
 
                                                        
cases), is variously labelled (Ii) (Williamson (2000), Weatherson 2004; Blackson 2007; 
Ramachandran 2009); (R) (Vogel 2010); (C) (Wong 2008); (1) (Cohen 2010); and (KMAR) (Zardini 
forthcoming). I borrow (MAR) from Berker (2008). 
7 My presentation of Williamson’s argument owes much to Berker’s (2008). 
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Weatherson (2004) and Vogel (2010) offer safety conditions on knowledge from which we 
can directly derive (MAR). According to both Weatherson’s ‘content safety’ condition and 
Vogel’s ‘strong reliability’ condition, one knows that a condition R obtains only if R obtains 
in all very similar cases. As Weatherson and Vogel argue, this version of the safety 
condition directly secures (MAR), but is itself implausible. Intuitively, for S’s belief that R 
obtains to be sufficiently safe for knowledge, it must be that there are no very similar cases 
in which S has an untrue belief that R obtains8. But a more plausible understanding of the 
safety condition9 – one that only mandates no nearby untrue belief – is insufficient to 
directly derive (MAR). For (MAR) states that it is a necessary condition on S’s knowing 
that C obtains in αi that C also obtain in αi+1. But S’s belief that she feels cold in αi could 
satisfy the ‘no nearby false belief’ condition so long as in all of the sufficiently similar not-
C cases, S didn’t believe that C obtained (cf. Berker (2008), p. 6). Luminists are right, then, 
to point out that a brute appeal to safety won’t alone secure (MAR). And they are also right 
to point out that Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument cannot run with safety alone; 
(MAR) is needed as a bridge principle from one moment to the next in order to deliver 
the reductio that S feels cold at noon. Thus the question is: how do we motivate (MAR)? 
 
Williamson can be read as offering not one but two answers to that question, each relying 
on different specifications of the safety requirement on knowledge. The first defence, 
which employs a safety condition in terms of outright belief, which I call (BELIEF-
SAFETY), is intended to work on the assumption that there is no constitutive connection 
between feeling cold and believing oneself to feel cold. The second defence, which 
employs a safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence, which I call 
(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY), is intended to allow for the possibility of such a connection. 
That is, the second defence is meant to secure (MAR), and thus the anti-luminosity 
argument, regardless of any possible constitutive connection between the phenomenal and 
doxastic realms. My plan is to elaborate and bolster each of Williamson’s defences of 
(MAR) in turn. In the first instance, I will argue that all we need to add to (BELIEF-
SAFETY) to generate (MAR) is a plausible empirical supposition about what kind of 
creatures we are. In the second, I will counter accusations that Williamson’s 
                                                        
8 I am assuming here and throughout my discussion of safety that for two cases of belief to be 
‘sufficiently similar’ they must involve sufficiently similar methods of belief-formation. Some 
specifications of safety factorize ‘sufficiently similar’ into a modal component (‘nearby’) and a 
methods or basing component. 
9 Like Weatherson’s ‘belief safety’ condition and Vogel’s ‘moderate reliability’ condition. 
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(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) is an implausible condition on knowledge, and argue that, 
again, (MAR) can be derived from it together with a plausible assumption about our 
empirical character. 
 
 4. Defending (MAR): non-constitutive accounts 
 
Williamson’s preliminary defence of (MAR) is intended to work on the assumption that 
there is no constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the doxastic – 
specifically, that one’s feeling cold isn’t constitutively tied to believing one feels cold. This 
defence invokes a safety condition in terms of outright belief, which we can approximate 
as follows: 
 
(BELIEF-SAFETY) In case α S knows that a condition R obtains only if, 
in all sufficiently similar cases in which S believes that R obtains, it is true that 
R obtains 
 
Roughly, (BELIEF-SAFETY) says that knowledge requires not just true belief, but the 
absence of nearby untrue belief10. (BELIEF-SAFETY) is intuitively plausible. Imagine I 
look through the window and form the true belief that it’s raining outside. Unbeknownst 
to me, a prankster has placed  a screen outside my window that projects an image of rain. 
Clearly I don’t know it’s raining outside, though it is. This is because in a nearby world – 
the world in which it has just stopped raining – I have the false belief that it’s raining. 
 
Despite the plausibility of (BELIEF-SAFETY), Vogel (2010) argues that we should reject 
it in favour of what he calls ‘moderate reliability’ (p. 549), which amounts to this: 
                                                        
10 What counts as a ‘sufficiently similar case’ (or a ‘nearby world’ or ‘similar method’) in definitions 
of safety is a vexed issue, analogous to what is known as the ‘generality problem’ for reliabilism 
(Conee and Feldman 1998). Williamson (2000) argues that the upshot of this problem is that we 
can offer no reductive analysis of reliability, and that our judgments about similarity of cases must 
be informed by our intuitions about what constitutes an instance of knowledge or ignorance. This 
means that any claim to knowledge or ignorance is subject to dismissal via an alternative judgment 
about similarity of cases. It is worthwhile noting that this is equally true of the 
knowledge/ignorance claims involved in Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. That is, the 
luminist could simply argue that the possible not-cold case in which S believed she was cold is too 
dissimilar to undermine the safety of S’s belief in αi. In particular, the luminist could simply argue 
that S’s possible false belief has a different basis from S’s actual true belief (in the first case, S 
believes on the basis of feeling cold that she feels cold; in the latter case she believes on some other 
basis). These are both easy (if unconvincing) ways of defending luminosity against Williamson’s 
putative counterexample. Cf. Weatherson (2004, 4). 
 7 
 
(VOGEL-SAFETY): In case α S knows that a condition R obtains only if, 
in all sufficiently similar cases in which S believes that R obtains, it is not false 
that R obtains 
 
The difference between (BELIEF-SAFETY) and (VOGEL-SAFETY) comes into play 
when (if ever) it is neither true nor false that R obtains11. Suppose that as S moves through 
COLD MORNING, it is first true that S feels cold, then neither true nor false that S feels 
cold, and finally false that S feels cold. Now imagine that S is in the final instance of feeling 
cold, tc. Can S know that she feels cold at tc? (BELIEF-SAFETY) says no, while (VOGEL-
SAFETY) says yes. Which safety condition gives us the correct treatment of cases such as 
these? Vogel offers the following thought experiment to motivate his version of safety: 
 
Umpire. Imagine that there is an umpire who is invariably correct about 
every clear case of balls and strikes. That is, whenever television replay can 
discern one way or the other, the umpire is right, even on extremely close 
pitches. Every once in a while, the umpire calls as a ball a pitch that seems 
“too close to call” even on replay (549). 
 
Vogel’s intuition is that the umpire is able to know about every clear case of balls and 
strikes, despite the fact in some of those cases he has nearby untrue beliefs. This result is 
compatible with (VOGEL-SAFETY) but not (BELIEF-SAFETY). My own intuition is 
that the umpire doesn’t know in all the clear cases, since whether or not he has any nearby 
false beliefs, he has nearby mistaken beliefs. The proximity of nearby beliefs that simply 
aren’t true seems sufficient to destroy his knowledge in those cases. In a footnote, Vogel 
offers another thought experiment: 
 
Color Chip. You see a number of color chips. Some are perfectly red, while 
the others are borderline red. The chips are placed in an urn, and one chip is 
chosen at random. Before you see the outcome, you believe that the selected 
chip will be red simpliciter, and it happens to be perfectly red (p. 556, ff. 15). 
 
Here, as Vogel himself agrees, it seems that you can’t know that the randomly chosen chip 
is red; this supports (BELIEF-SAFETY) over (VOGEL-SAFETY). It’s also worth noting 
                                                        
11 See Hawthorne (2005), Williamson (2005) and Zardini (forthcoming) for a discussion of the anti-
luminosity argument and its relation to the phenomenon of vagueness. 
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that (VOGEL-SAFETY) is going to have counterintuitive implications in cases of failed 
demonstratives12. Consider: 
 
Phantom tollbooth. You see a tollbooth, point to it and say: “That’s a 
tollbooth”. However, you’re on a drug that makes you hallucinate all sorts of 
things; in a very nearby world, the drug causes you to hallucinate a tollbooth. 
 
Intuitively, you don’t know that what you’re pointing to is indeed a tollbooth. But in the 
nearby possible world in which you hallucinate a tollbooth, the demonstrative ‘that’ fails 
to refer to anything at all, since there is no tollbooth. In such a possible case it seems 
intuitive to say that your tollbooth-belief is neither true nor false. This result is compatible 
with (BELIEF-SAFETY) but not (VOGEL-SAFETY). Finally, take a modalised version 
of Kripke’s contingent liar cases: 
 
 Jack and Jill. Jack believes that whatever Jill says next will be false. In a 
 nearby world, the next thing Jill says is “whatever Jack believes is false”. 
 
Intuitively, Jack doesn’t know that whatever Jill says next will be false, because in a nearby 
world that belief is not true – although that belief is not obviously false. Again, this 
intuition favours (BELIEF-SAFETY) over (VOGEL-SAFETY). 
 
Let’s assume that (BELIEF-SAFETY) is correct. Now recall: 
 
 (MAR) If K(C) obtains at αi then C obtains at αi+1  
 
To derive (MAR) from (BELIEF-SAFETY), what is needed is a principle that connects 
S’s belief about C in αi to S’s belief about C in αi+1. After all, asks Berker, might it not be 
possible for S to stop believing that she feels cold the precise moment she no longer feels 
cold? He writes: 
 
                                                        
12 For a discussion of how best to formulate safety in light of this sort of consideration, see 
Manley (2007). 
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[W]ho is to say that…as one gradually gets warmer and warmer during the 
course of the morning while carefully attending to how cold one feels, one 
stops feeling cold before one stops believing that one feels cold? (2008, p. 8). 
 
If so, Berker suggests, then S’s belief that she feels cold would satisfy (BELIEF-SAFETY) 
without (MAR)’s being true. To close the gap between (BELIEF-SAFETY) and (MAR), 
Berker proposes the following: 
 
 (BEL)  If S believes C obtains in αi, then S believes C obtains in αi+1 
 
And indeed, (MAR) follows easily from (BELIEF-SAFETY) and (BEL). If S’s believing 
she feels cold at one moment entails that she believes she feels cold at the next, then by 
(BELIEF-SAFETY) if S knows she feels cold at one moment she must feel cold at the next. 
But (BEL) is untenable13. It is a soritical premise, since one can generate a paradox from it 
along with the assumptions that S believes that she feels cold at dawn and that S does not 
believe that she feels cold at noon (Berker (2008), 7; Vogel (2010), 561). By the description 
of Cold Morning, S believes she feels cold at dawn and stops believing she feels cold 
sometime later; it cannot be true that belief in one case entails identical belief in the next. 
(BEL) is quite obviously not always true. 
 
No matter. Nothing as strong as (BEL) is needed to derive (MAR) from (BELIEF-
SAFETY). According to (BELIEF-SAFETY), knowledge that one is cold is incompatible 
with untrue belief that one is cold in sufficiently similar cases. Now, imagine that in αi S 
feels cold, and in αi+1 it is no longer the case that she feels cold. And imagine that in αi she 
believes truly that she feels cold and in αi+1 she doesn’t believe she feels cold. That is, her 
belief that she feels cold stops immediately with the cessation of her feeling cold, as per 
Berker’s suggestion. Does S’s belief that she feels cold in αi satisfy (BELIEF-SAFETY)? 
Not necessarily. For it could well be that in some sufficiently similar non-actual case βi+1, 
S continues to believe she feels cold after she stops feeling cold.  αi is a case in the actual 
world, as is αi+1. But there are also non-actual cases that are sufficiently similar to αi to 
destroy knowledge if S untruly believes in them that she is cold. To pass the safety test for 
knowledge, it is insufficient that one, as a matter of chance, lack untrue belief in all actual 
                                                        
13 That is, understood as a universal generalisation. This applies to my discussion of (BEL*) as 
well. 
 10 
similar cases. One must also lack untrue belief in possible similar cases. This means that it is 
much easier for S to fail to know that she is cold than some luminists seem to think. All 
that is required to derive (MAR) from (BELIEF-SAFETY) is something like the 
following14: 
 
 (BEL*) If in case αi S believes she feels cold, then there exists a 
 sufficiently similar possible case βi+1 in which S’s cold-feelings are a 
 phenomenal duplicate of her cold-feelings in αi+1 and in which S believes 
 she feels cold. 
 
Together, (BELIEF-SAFETY) and (BEL*) yield (MAR). If in a given actual case, S knows 
that she feels cold, then by (BELIEF-SAFETY) there cannot be any very similar cases in 
which she believes she is cold but isn’t. According to (BEL*), if S believes she feels cold 
at one moment, there is some nearby world in which she believes she feels cold in the next 
moment (holding her feelings of cold at that moment fixed) (cf. Vogel (2010), 562). So, if 
in a given actual case S knows she feels cold, then she must feel cold in the next actual case 
– viz., (MAR). 
 
(BEL*), unlike (BEL), is highly plausible15. First, (BEL*) is just the kind of thing you would 
expect to be true of creatures like us. This is because we don’t just believe at random. Our 
mental lives are structured by certain dispositions. When we believe something in one set 
of circumstances, in very similar circumstances we have a disposition to believe the same 
thing. (BEL*) should be understood as encoding the empirical assumption that S, being a 
                                                        
14 Berker suggests, but then rejects, a similar modalised version of (BEL), which he calls (BEL’) 
(2008, p. 7, ff. 11). I address Berker’s objection to (BEL*)/(BEL’) shortly. 
15 Again, on the assumption that there is no constitutive connection between the phenomenal 
and the doxastic. 
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creature like us, shares these dispositions161718. We might call this the doxastic disposition 
premise: 
 
 (DOXDIS):  If in condition R, S believes she is F, then for any condition 
 R’ very similar to R, S has some disposition in R’ to believe she is F. 
 
(DOXDIS) seems to me fairly uncontroversial19. Imagine I am looking at a jar full of 1000 
marbles; I don’t know how many marbles there are in the jar, but I form the belief that 
there are lot of marbles in the jar. If I’m then confronted with a very similar scenario – a 
jar with, say, 999 marbles, at a similar distance and in similar lighting conditions, etc. – I 
am disposed in that scenario to believe, again, that there are a lot of marbles in the jar. This 
is so even if I don’t as it happens believe, in the second scenario, that there are a lot of 
marbles in the jar. Of course, what counts as a ‘very similar condition’ in (DOXDIS) will 
turn on, in part, what agents have the disposition to believe in the relevant situations. If I 
                                                        
16 Cohen (2010, 727-30) discusses deriving (MAR) from an empirical premise and a safety condition 
on knowledge, though Cohen’s empirical premise repeats Williamson’s talk of ‘indiscriminability’, 
which I find unhelpfully opaque. Cohen ultimately argues that this strategy does not work because 
it makes Williamson’s argument circular: 
 
[According to Williamson] our judgment that αi+1 is similar to αi may require the 
judgment that if one could wrongly believe one feels cold in αi+1, then in αi one does 
not know one feels cold. Given [the empirical premise], this requires the judgment 
that in αi one knows one feels cold only if in αi+1 one feels cold. And this is just the 
judgment that [(MAR)] is true (729) (cf. Blackson (2010, 402)). 
 
Quite. Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument requires that one make certain judgments about 
similarity, and on Williamson’s view, these judgments are interdependent with our judgments about 
knowledge. Thus the anti-luminosity argument shows that if one wants to defend luminosity, one 
must deny that the cases in Cold Morning (and the possible phenomenologically identical cases) 
are similar, which seems absurd. This might be circular, but it is only viciously so if the luminist were 
antecedently willing to deny what seems (to me at least) evidently true: that the situations in which 
S finds herself from one moment to the next are similar. 
17 I assume here, I take it uncontroversially, that the actual and possible cases under discussion here 
are very similar (but see the previous footnote). This is a feature of Cold Morning, and not a general 
feature of our experience. 
18 There might be certain cases of possessing dispositions to believe p that do not entail having a 
nearby belief that p: for example, the disposition to believe of the Müeller-Lyer illusion that the 
lines are of different length. Since I plausibly retain such a disposition even when it is well 
suppressed by my awareness of the illusion, this might be a case where a disposition to believe p 
doesn’t entail a nearby belief that p. But such unusual cases are not my concern here. 
19 Though it might demand some refinement. Imagine that there is an extremely low objective 
chance that Hanna will believe that p in condition R. Despite the terrible odds, she forms the 
belief that p in R. Does she have a disposition to believe p in circumstances that are extremely 
similar to R? Perhaps not. But the issue needn’t worry us here; I mean (DOXDIS) only to be able 
to handle the kind of central cases of belief-dispositions at issue here. 
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totally lack the disposition to believe the same in two situations20, this in part constitutes 
their not being very similar. 
 
If this empirical characterisations of our doxastic dispositions is correct, then the luminist 
who wants to accept (BELIEF-SAFETY) while rejecting (MAR) is under pressure to deny 
a highly intuitive picture of how we work. In particular, he will have to maintain that, in 
the first case of not feeling cold, S has no disposition whatsoever to believe that she feels 
cold. It is insufficient, pace various luminists, that S simply happen not to believe that she 
feels cold when she stops feeling cold; she must lack even the disposition to so believe. 
But it is implausible that S – since she is, ex hypothesi, a creature like us – lacks such a 
disposition21. Thus it is implausible that any conditions of interest are, for us, luminous. 
Second, (BEL*), unlike (BEL), is not obviously a soritical premise. It does not trade on 
the vagueness of ‘believes’, but is instead a specific claim about what is true of S in Cold 
Morning; our assent to is secured by what we know about the doxastic dispositions of 
creatures like ourselves in situations like Cold Morning. 
 
While Berker acknowledges that (BEL*) is not straightforwardly soritical in the way that 
(BEL) is, he suggests that (BEL*) nonetheless has a soritical consequence. This is because 
repeated applications of (BEL*) yield the conclusion that it is possible for S to feel 
extremely hot while believing she feels cold22. Berker claims that this is an unacceptably 
absurd consequence of (BEL*)23. He writes: 
 
                                                        
20 Here and throughout I talk about having ‘the disposition to believe the same in similar 
situations’. By this I mean not that for any two similar situations we will have the same 
disposition to believe in those situations, but rather that if in the first situation we believe 
something, then in the second we have a disposition to believe the same thing.  
21 Some luminists appear to think that what is at stake dialectically in the anti-luminosity debate is 
whether there are any possible creatures who enjoy luminosity, not whether we are such creatures 
ourselves. See section 5 for a discussion of why this is misguided. 
22 Berker in fact claims that repeated applications of (BEL*) yield the conclusion that one could 
believe oneself to feel cold while feeling as hot as “if one were in the center of the sun” (ff. 11, p. 
7). Since it’s doubtful that one would feel much of anything if one were in the centre of the sun, I 
take it that Berker just means ‘extremely hot’. It’s worth noting that one can’t generate this 
consequence from repeated applications of (BEL*) alone – one would need analogous principles 
that apply not just to α cases, but also β cases and so forth. It’s also worth noting that if, as seems 
not implausible, there is an upper bound to how cold or hot one can feel, then not all of these 
analogous principles will be true. 
23 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me. 
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I think we should have serious doubts that such a case is even possible – 
serious doubts that there could exist a being who counts as having beliefs and 
experiences, and yet whose beliefs and experiences are as wildly at odds with 
one another as they would be in [the case in which one feels extremely hot 
but believes oneself to feel cold] (2008, ff. 11, 7-8). 
 
Is it really so hard to countenance such a possibility? The similarity relation is intransitive, 
so a case in which one felt extremely hot but believed oneself to feel cold would be a case 
very dissimilar to the one imagined in Cold Morning. In particular, the intransitivity of 
‘very similar method’ means that, in such a case, one might very well be using a method 
very different from the one a normally functioning person uses to form beliefs about her 
feelings of cold. One could, for example, be the victim of prolonged psychological priming, 
or in the grip of a certain philosophical picture of the mind that makes one systematically 
distrust one’s inclinations to judge one’s own phenomenal state. Is it really so hard to 
imagine someone in these conditions coming to believe she feels cold when she actually 
feels extremely hot? These possible cases might be remote, no doubt. But their existence 
– like the existence of bad sceptical worlds – does nothing to undermine S’s ability to know 
in normal situations. That (BEL*) implies that they are possible is thus no knock against 
it. In any case, as Berker himself notes, this objection to (BEL*) seems motivated by a view 
on which the phenomenal and the doxastic enjoy a constitutive connection. Such a view 
is not my target here, and (BEL*) will not feature in my argument against it. 
 
Before moving to my second defence of (MAR), one that loosens the assumption that 
there is no constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the doxastic, let me take 
quick stock. On my favoured reconstruction of the anti-luminosity argument (for non-
constitutive accounts), its essence is this. Imagine that S, like us, is the sort of creature for 
whom believing something in one situation means having, in extremely similar situations, 
the disposition to believe the same thing. Suppose that S is in a condition C, but in what 
we might call a ‘liminal’ case of it24. That is, there is an extremely similar case to the one 
she is in which is not a case of C. Imagine that S believes she is in C; is this belief 
                                                        
24 The appeal to liminal cases here does not appeal to the vagueness of the concept of C. One can 
imagine those borders firmly fixed. So, for example, imagine that S is in condition C just in case 
she is experiencing at least 100 units of x (where x is some phenomenal experience, e.g. feelings of 
cold), and imagine that she is experiencing exactly 100 units of x. I avoid the more obvious 
terminology of ‘borderline’ cases because of its associations with semantic/conceptual vagueness. 
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knowledge? It seems not. For in the very similar non-C case, S has the disposition to 
believe she is in C. Thus, her true belief that she is in C is rendered unreliable by a nearby 
untrue belief that she is in C. Thus in such a liminal case of being in C, S cannot know that 
she is in C. This argument generalises to all non-trivial conditions and for all subjects whose 
beliefs are structured by these sorts of dispositions. That is, it generalises to all interesting 
mental state conditions in which creatures like us plausibly find ourselves. 
 
My reconstruction of the anti-luminosity argument differs from the original in avoiding 
Williamson’s favoured talk of our ‘limited powers of discrimination’. According to 
Williamson, it is this cognitive limitation that drives the anti-luminosity argument (2000, 
12, 97, 103-4). While Williamson unpacks the idea in various ways2526, I take its essence to 
be this. When we are thinking about whether or not we are in some sort of state, we turn 
our attention to the relevant underlying phenomenon that constitutes that state. When it 
comes to figuring out whether there is any milk in the fridge, we train our attention on the 
contents of the fridge. Similarly, when it comes to figuring out whether we feel cold, we 
turn our attention to our sensations of cold27. Now, it is a disappointing truth of our 
perceptual capacities that they are not infinitely discriminating: we cannot always tell of 
two distinct things whether they are indeed distinct. If, by chance, we come to believe that 
two indiscriminable situations are in fact different, this lucky belief does not constitute 
knowledge. Thus, our limited perceptual capacities limit our ability to know. Williamson’s 
anti-luminosity argument can be understood as an application of this observation to the 
phenomenal sphere. In training our attention on our underlying sensations of cold and 
hot, we cannot reliably distinguish between two extremely similar sensations, one of which 
                                                        
25 Some of which can sound somewhat question-begging. Consider the following: 
 
The main idea behind the argument against luminosity is that our powers of 
discrimination are limited. If we are in a case α, and a case α’ is close enough to α, 
then for all we know we are in α’. Thus what we are in a position to know in α is still 
true in α’. Consequently, a luminous condition obtains in α only if it also obtains in 
α’, for it obtains in α only if we are in a position to know that it obtains in α. (2000, 
12). 
 
One might have a similar worry about Williamson’s stipulation that in “[S] is not aware of any 
change in [her feelings of cold or hot] over one millisecond” (2000, 97) and that she is “almost 
equally confident that [she] feels cold, by the description of the case” (2000, 97). These glosses on 
the argument can sound more like re-descriptions of its conclusion than reason to accept it. 
26 cf. Vogel (2010, part II) for a discussion of what Williamson might mean by ‘limited powers of 
discrimination’, and how this generally relates to the luminosity doctrine. 
27 This presupposes a broadly perceptual model of self-knowledge. For a discussion of alternative 
models and how they interact with the anti-luminosity argument, see section 5. 
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is cold and the other of which is not. Since reliability is required for knowledge, we cannot 
know that we are cold in such a case28. Of course, the luminist can simply reply that this 
too begs the question against him. For any defender of the luminous could simply reject 
the idea that our powers of discrimination are limited. But this is to maintain not only that 
we have privileged access to our mental states, but also that our perceptual capacities when 
it comes to attending to those mental states, unlike attending to external world states, are 
infinitely discriminating. And this might seem like a large bullet to bite. 
 
How does this interpretation of Williamson’s original argument square with my own 
reconstruction? My empirical premise – (DOXDIS) – is certainly compatible with 
Williamson’s (also empirical) claim that our powers of discrimination are limited. But it is 
also compatible with a variety of other stories we might want to tell about how our 
phenomenal beliefs arise29. Whatever version of that story we embrace, it seems undeniable 
that creatures like us our disposed to believe the same things in extremely similar situations. 
Of course, what we mean by ‘similar’ here matters crucially. The luminist can always resist 
the claim, necessary for (BEL*) to follow from (DOXDIS), that the situations from one 
moment to the next in Cold Morning are, indeed, ‘very similar’. And, as Williamson himself 
admits, our judgments about similarity are inevitably bound up with our epistemic 
judgments (Williamson 2000, 101-1). So the luminist can always dig in his heels 
somewhere; my formulation of the argument in terms of doxastic dispositions will not 
compel the dogmatic luminist to abandon his views. But, if my reconstruction of 
Williamson’s argument works, then the price the luminist has to pay for resisting it is very 
high indeed. He must either deny that we are creatures who are disposed to believe similarly 
in similar situations, or insist that the cases from one moment to the next in Williamson’s 
thought experiment should not count as similar. Both options seem to me perverse. As 
such, defending (MAR) by invoking a safety condition on knowledge together with the 
minimal (DOXDIS) seems to me dialectically preferable to Williamson’s own defence in 
terms of finite powers of discrimination. 
                                                        
28 We might worry that this argument isn’t enough. The mere ability to distinguish dissimilar 
things is not the same thing as the ability to correct categorise them under concepts. Thus I 
might be able to distinguish two distinct phenomenal sensations without being in a position to 
know that one is a feeling of cold and another isn’t. (Compare: I might be able to distinguish 
between the sound of French and the sound of German, but this doesn’t mean that I’m always in 
a position to know that I’m hearing French rather than German). If so, then this is another 
reason to prefer my version of the anti-luminosity argument in terms of dispositions to believe. 
29 These alternative stories become particularly important when we consider the possibility, 
discussed in the next section, that the phenomenal is constitutively connected to the doxastic. 
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 4. Defending (MAR): constitutive accounts 
 
In defending (MAR) against the luminists, I argued that it derived easily from a simple 
safety condition on knowledge, (BELIEF-SAFETY), coupled with the plausible premise 
(BEL*), which in turn is justified by the empirical premise (DOXDIS). However, (BEL*) 
is subject to complaint from those luminists who maintain that phenomenal conditions 
such as feeling cold have a constitutive connection to one’s beliefs about whether one feels 
cold. As such, the anti-luminosity argument as elaborated so far is impotent against a 
popular view of the phenomenal (Weatherson (2004), Berker (2008) and Ramachandran 
(2009))30. Imagine that the following were true of the relationship between S’s beliefs about 
feeling cold and the facts about her feeling cold: 
 
 (CON) If S has done everything she can to decide whether she 
 feels cold, then she believes that she feels cold if and only if she feels 
 cold.31 
 
Since by the description of Cold Morning, S is doing everything she can to decide whether 
she feels cold, her coming to believe that she feels cold is both necessary and sufficient for 
her indeed feeling cold. Now recall (BEL*): 
 
(BEL*)  If in αi S believes she feels cold, then there exists a 
sufficiently similar possible case βi+1 in which S’s cold-feelings are a 
phenomenal duplicate of her cold-feelings in αi+1 and in which S believes she 
feels cold. 
 
If (CON) is true, then (BEL*) is false. Why? By the description of Cold Morning, there is 
some value i such that S believes she feels cold in αi and no longer believes she feels cold 
in αi+1. (CON) entails that for that value of i, S does indeed feel cold at αi and no longer 
                                                        
30 Berker and Ramachandran both propose that feeling cold might be a response-dependent 
condition, while Weatherson argues along physicalist lines that feeling cold and believing oneself 
to be cold could in fact consist in the same brain state. There are various possible ways of unpacking 
what the constitutive connection between feeling cold and believing oneself to feel cold might 
amount to. 
31 Adapted from Berker (2008), p. 9. 
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feels cold αi+1. And according to (CON), any case that is a phenomenological duplicate of 
αi+1 (with regard to S’s feelings of cold) will also be a doxastic duplicate of αi+1. So (BEL*) 
goes false for the value of i such that S believes she feels cold in αi and no longer believes 
she feels cold in αi+1. For that value of i, it is not the true that there exists a possible case 
βi+1 in which S’s cold-feelings are a phenomenal duplicate of her cold feelings in αi+1 and 
in which S believes C obtains. Thus, if (CON) is true, (BEL*) is false. 
 
To defend (MAR) without assuming, as we have been doing, that (CON) is false, we need 
to appeal to Williamson’s refined safety requirement in terms of degrees of confidence3233. 
We might specify this safety condition as follows: 
 
(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) If in case α S knows with degree of 
confidence c that she is in a condition R, then in any sufficiently similar case 
α* in which S has an at-most-slightly-lower degree of confidence c* that she 
is in condition R, it is true that she is in condition R. 
 
The idea behind (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) is that for one to know that one is in a given 
condition, it cannot be the case that one is almost as confident that one is in that condition 
– even if that confidence is short of full-fledged belief – in a sufficiently similar situation. 
That is, nearby misplaced confidence – high confidence in an untruth – is sufficient to 
                                                        
32 Williamson distinguishes these from degrees of subjective probability measured by one’s betting 
behaviour. A degree of confidence is a degree of outright belief: 
 
Intuitively, one believes p outright when one is willing to use p as a premise in 
practical reasoning. Thus one may assign p a high subjective probability without 
believing p outright, if the corresponding premise in one’s practical reasoning is just 
that p is highly probable on one’s evidence, not p itself…we can think of one’s degree 
of outright belief in p as the degree to which one relies on p. Outright belief in a false 
proposition makes for unreliability because it is reliance on a falsehood (2000, p. 99). 
 
On Williamson’s view, one can have a certain degree of confidence (outright belief) without having 
an outright belief. This non-standard distinction has created a lot of confusion about Williamson’s 
argument (e.g. Blackson 2007). Cf. Ramachandran’s discussion (2009, 663, especially footnote 3). 
Ramachandran’s first interpretation (he offers four in total) of Williamson’s argument relies on a 
(deliberate) misreading of Williamson’s notion of confidence. 
33 Cohen (2010) argues, quite correctly, that (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) cannot be derived from 
(BELIEF-SAFETY) without a soritical premise, namely that a slight change in degree of 
confidence does not affect whether one believes outright. He thus concludes that 
(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) cannot be generally motivated. However, Williamson intends 
(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) to be his fully elaborated safety condition, itself an intuitively 
plausible gloss on the reliability requirement for knowledge. Here I defend it as such. 
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preclude knowledge. Let us grant for the sake of argument that S’s feeling cold is 
constitutively connected to her belief that she feels cold in the way (CON) specifies. 
Imagine that in αi S truly believes that she feels cold, and that in αi+1 she is still quite 
confident that she feels cold, but insufficiently confident for outright belief. By (CON), S 
feels cold in αi but does not feel cold in αi+1. But by (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY), S does 
not know that she feels cold in αi. So even a constitutive connection between feeling cold 
and believing one feels cold is insufficient to vindicate luminosity. 
 
Again, to derive (MAR) from (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) one needs an additional 
assumption that links S’s confidence that she feels cold to her confidence that she feels 
cold in nearby cases. Berker proposes something like the following: 
 
(CONF)  If in αi S has degree of confidence c that she feels cold, then 
in αi+1 S has an at-most-slightly-lower degree of confidence c* that she feels 
cold 
 
While Berker does not wish to dispute (CONF) – saying that it “seems indisputable, given 
the description of the situation at hand” (2008, p. 12) – it is again worth noting that, as 
with (BEL), (CONF) is unnecessarily strong. To generate (MAR) from (CONFIDENCE-
SAFETY), the following weaker premise will do: 
 
(CONF*)  If in αi S has degree of confidence c that she feels cold, 
there exists a sufficiently similar possible case βi+1 in which S’s cold-feelings 
are a phenomenal duplicate of her cold-feelings in αi+1 and in which S has an 
at-most-slightly-lower degree of confidence c* that she feels cold 
 
It should be clear that (CONF*) is even more plausible than (CONF), again by appeal to 
an empirical premise: 
 
 (DOXDIS*):  If in condition R, S believes with confidence level x that she 
 is F, then for any condition R’ very similar to R, S has some disposition in 
 R’ to believe with confidence levels similar to x that she is F. 
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Roughly, (DOXDIS*) is the claim that if in a certain situation S has a certain confidence 
level, then in a very similar situation she is disposed to have a very similar confidence 
level34. As such, if at αi S has degree of confidence c that she feels cold, there exists a 
sufficiently similar possible case in which S feels just as cold as she does in αi+1 and has a 
degree of confidence c* that she feels cold that is at most slightly slightly lower than c (and 
thus similar to c). Like (BEL*), (CONF*) is not a soritical premise, since it cannot be used 
to generate the (obviously false) conclusion that S has the same or similar degree of 
confidence at dawn and noon that she is in C. Rather than trading on the vagueness of any 
of its constituent terms, (CONF*) encodes a plausible empirical premise about our 
dispositions to believe similarly in similar situation. And finally, unlike (BEL*), (CONF*) 
is compatible with (CON). While (BEL*) entailed that S’s belief about whether she feels 
cold could possibly come apart from the fact of whether she feels cold – in contradiction 
with (CON) – (CONF*) doesn’t entail anything of the sort. Instead, (CONF*) merely 
entails that S’s confidence levels about her feelings of cold are similar in similar cases. This 
is perfectly compatible with the response-dependent view that S’s believing she feels cold 
is both necessary and sufficient for her feeling cold. 
 
In any case, it is at (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) that many luminists direct their attack 
(Leitgeb (2002), Berker (2008), Ramachandran (2009), Cohen (2010)). They hope to show 
that (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) is a non-genuine condition on knowledge, leaving us 
only with the original defence of (MAR) in terms of (BELIEF-SAFETY), and thus the 
constitutive connection view of the phenomenal unscathed by the anti-luminosity 
argument. For example, in his attack on (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY), Cohen argues: 
 
[I]t is not obvious why one’s confidence at ti is misplaced. We are supposing 
that at ti one knows one feels cold. Thus at ti one feels cold and one believes 
one feels cold. It follows that if at ti+1 one no longer believes one feels cold, 
then at ti one just barely believes one feels cold. Now suppose one no longer 
feels cold at ti+1. Then one just barely feels cold at ti. So under these 
suppositions, at ti one just barely feels cold and one just barely believes one 
feels cold. So how is one’s confidence at ti misplaced? (Cohen 2010, 726). 
                                                        
34 (DOXDIS) and (DOXDIS*) can be subsumed under a more general empirical principle: If in 
condition R S has attitude A towards p, then for any similar attitude A’ and similar condition R’, S 
in R’ has some disposition to have A’ toward p. 
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In a similar spirit, Berker writes: 
 
[W]hy should we withhold the honorific ‘reliable’ in the kinds of cases 
Williamsons describes? …[W]hat if one’s belief that p tapers off (as it were) 
just as its being the case that p tapers off, and in precisely the same 
way?...(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) deems as unreliable belief-forming 
mechanisms that appear to be as reliable as they could possibly be (2008, p. 
12). 
 
Spelling out this line of objection, Berker proposes that we think of S’s feelings of cold in 
terms of numbers of “freezons”. He imagines that at dawn S experiences 50 freezons 
worth of cold, that at noon she experiences -50 freezons worth of cold, and at any time 
during the day her degree of confidence that she feels cold is directly correlated with her 
subjective feeling of cold as measured in freezons. Finally, Berker supposes that S believes 
she feels cold if and only if she indeed feels cold. That is, S’s confidence that she feels cold 
drops below the belief-threshold at precisely the same moment she ceases feeling cold. If 
(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) is true, then S, at some point during the day, fails to know 
that she feels cold. But Berker objects that this is absurd, since “one’s beliefs about whether 
one feels cold appear to be as reliable as they possibly could be” (2008, p. 13). In the same 
vein, Ramachandran writes: 
 
[(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY)] is too strong a requirement because it would 
rule out luminosity in the hypothesized ‘perfect-calibration’ situation, which 
is daft, because one couldn’t be any more reliable (2009, 668; cf. Leitgeb 
(2002), 216)35. 
 
While there is something no doubt attractive in the Leitgeb-Berker-Ramachandran-Cohen 
thought that this ‘perfect calibration situation’ represents some sort of maximally reliable 
possibility – and thus that (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) can’t possibly be a genuine 
                                                        
35 Ramachandran (668) ultimately does not endorse this line of argument on the grounds that the 
individual it imagines is too different from the subject in Cold Morning. I take this to be a bad 
objection because the issue is whether (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) is a genuine condition on 
knowledge in general. 
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condition on knowledge – that attraction isn’t too difficult to shake. Consider the following 
case, analogous to Berker’s freezons case: 
 
Glass Half Full. Henry likes watching glasses slowly fill with water. In 
normal conditions and when he is paying close attention, Henry believes that 
glasses are at least half full if and only if they are indeed at least half-full. It 
thus follows that the confidence threshold for outright belief is 50%. 
Henry pays close attention as an empty glass is being filled up with water. 
Henry only forms beliefs about a single proposition q, that the glass is at least 
half full. Henry’s confidence in q is directly correlated with the volume of water 
in the glass, rising slowly and steadily from 0% to 100% as the glass is filled. 
 
Does Glass Half Full, as Berker et al suggest, represent a ‘perfect calibration situation’? 
Surely not. When the glass is only a fifth full – that is, very obviously less than half-full, 
even to an average estimator – Henry still has a 20% confidence that the glass is at least 
half-full. And when the glass is four-fifths full – that is, very obviously more than half-full, 
even to an average estimator – Henry has only an 80% confidence that the glass is at least 
half-full. Henry’s confidence profile is hardly a maximally reliable possibility. The 
suggestion that Henry, or Berker’s freezons subject, represents a ‘perfect calibration 
situation’ is thus misguided. So it cannot be reason to think that either case constitutes a 
counterexample to (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY). 
 
A more promising line for the luminist is to suggest that Glass Half Full is a 
counterexample to (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) because it is plausible that Henry, while 
hardly being maximally reliable, nonetheless knows q whenever q is true. After all, not only 
is Henry’s belief that q always true in the actual case, the stipulation that, in normal 
conditions and when he is paying close attention, Henry believes q if and only if q means 
that he has no nearby untrue beliefs that q. Which is to say, Henry’s q-beliefs satisfy 
(BELIEF-SAFETY). However, Henry’s belief that q when the glass is exactly half full does 
not satisfy (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY), since just a moment earlier – when the glass was 
almost half-full – Henry had a high confidence just short of belief in q. If it seems plausible 
that Henry knows q when the glass is exactly half full, this tells against (CONFIDENCE-
SAFETY) in favour of the less demanding (BELIEF-SAFETY). 
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The crucial question then is: does Henry know that the glass is at least half full when the 
glass is exactly half full? There is reason to think not. After all, even if Henry reliably tips 
over the threshold to outright belief just when q becomes true, it’s also the case that he 
reliably almost believes q when q is untrue. That is, in nearby cases in which q is untrue, 
Henry has a high confidence that it is true. Specifically, at the point at which the glass is 
only 49% full, Henry is 49% confident that the glass is at least half-full. This seems to 
undermine Henry’s claim to know that the glass is at least half full just a moment later, 
when the glass is exactly half-full. It is particularly hard to think that Henry knows when 
the glass is exactly half-full if one accepts a common picture of the relationship between 
confidence and practical reasoning. According to that picture, one’s confidence in a 
proposition p is a measure of one’s willingness to rely on p as a premise in practical 
reasoning; one believes outright when one’s willingness to rely on p crosses a certain 
threshold36. If so, then a confidence just short of outright belief in p will yield some cases 
in which one uses p in one’s practical reasoning, despite not believing p outright. When the 
glass is only 49% full, Henry’s 49% confidence that the glass is at least half-full means that 
he has some tendency to use q in his decision-making; if he were making several q-relevant 
but independent decisions at the same time, we could expect to see Henry acting on q 
when it is false. This nearby willingness to act on q when it is untrue intuitively undermines 
Henry’s claim to know q in the case where q has just become true.  
 
Perhaps though the most decisive case in favour of (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) can be 
made by tweaking the thought experiments that motivated safety in the first place. Take 
for example: 
 
Receding Fake Barns. Mirra is looking at two rows of what look like barns 
in the distance. The first row is made up of real barns; the second row is fake. 
In situations like this, Mirra reliably forms only the true belief that she is 
seeing real barns. The threshold for outright belief is 70% confidence. Of the 
first row, Mirra believes with 70% confidence that it is made up of barns. Of 
the second row, Mirra believes with 69% confidence that it is made up of 
barns. 
 
                                                        
36 That is to say, one’s believing p isn’t anything over and above meeting a certain threshold for 
confidence – e.g. putting p in one’s belief-box or mentally asserting p.  
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Mirra’s belief that the first row of barns is real is reliably true. But it seems strange to say 
that Mirra knows that the first row of barns is real. After all, Mirra has a 69% confidence 
that the fake barns right behind the real barns are themselves real. Even if that confidence 
is just shy of belief, and even if she reliably forms only confidences just short of belief in 
untrue propositions, it is implausible to say that Mirra knows. Intuitively, safety requires 
more than the absence of nearby untrue belief; it requires the absence of nearby untrue 
almost-belief. If so, then luminosity demands not only that our phenomenal beliefs satisfy 
(BELIEF-SAFETY); it demands that our phenomenal beliefs further satisfy 
(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY). Since the former but not the latter can be satisfied by beliefs 
that enjoy a constitutive connection to their phenomenal contents, it seems that no non-
trivial mental conditions are luminous. 
 
This is not to say that no possible creature could have a degree-of-confidence profile that 
satisfied both (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) and luminosity. Take again Henry, who 
believes q, that the glass is at least half full, if and only if q. Imagine that at the point at 
which q becomes true, Henry’s confidence level discontinuously jumps from low to high 
– from, say, 10% to 90%. In so doing, Henry believes not just truly but moreover safely 
that the glass is at least half full whenever it is indeed at least half full. Thus for him the 
condition of the glass being at least half full is luminous. Analogously, if the subject of 
Berker’s freezon case were to exhibit a jump down from a high to low confidence at the 
point at which she no longer feels cold37, then for her, feeling cold would be luminous. As 
Berker himself notes, physical systems are rarely characterised by such discontinuity (2008, 
15). As such, it’s very implausible for creatures like us anything very much is luminous. 
 
Berker however draws a different lesson. He claims that to maintain that 
(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) is a genuine condition on knowledge is to “insist not just that 
reliability is required for knowledge, but moreover that perfect reliability is required, and that 
way scepticism lies” (ibid 15). But this is very misleading. It is the objector to 
(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY), not its proponent, who demands perfection. Even Henry, 
                                                        
37 Berker describes such a confidence profile (see his Figure 2, p. 14) as one in which one is 
absolutely certain (i.e. has confidence 1) that one feels cold when one indeed feels cold, and 
drops off to confidence 0 when one doesn’t feel cold. But nothing this extreme is required. 
(CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) and the luminosity of feeling cold are together consistent with a 
more leisurely descent in confidence both above and below the belief-threshold; all that is 
required is a discontinuous drop-off at the point where one ceases to feel cold (in the actual and 
very similar cases). 
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whom all will admit is a pretty dismal estimator, gets to know some of the time, according 
to (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY), that the glass is at least half-full. And similarly for Berker’s 
freezon subject. (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) will deliver even more generous verdicts 
when it comes to imperfect epistemic agents like us; while diverging quite a bit from the 
maximally reliable confidence profile, we still get to know much of the time that we are in 
various conditions. (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) doesn’t generally demand perfection; far 
from it. Rather, it implies that we are not perfect, which is a different thing altogether. Our 
implied imperfection is no reason to reject (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY). Or, rather, it is 
no reason beyond an antecedent affection for luminosity. 
 
It’s worth noting that the luminist could simply deny that (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY) is 
a genuine condition on knowledge of the phenomenal, even if he accepts it as a genuine 
condition on knowledge of external states like the volume in a glass or the presence of 
barns. His willingness to do so will turn on the particular picture of the phenomenal-
doxastic connection to which he is committed, or willing to commit himself in order to 
vindicate luminosity. If, for example, one maintained that feeling cold is simply a matter of 
believing oneself to be cold – that there is no underlying phenomenon of ‘feeling cold’ 
that our beliefs are tracking or failing to track – then one could plausibly insist that models 
of reliability that are based on perceptual capacities are here inapplicable. In this way, a 
commitment to (CON) might still offer a weapon of resistance against (MAR), and thus 
the anti-luminosity argument. But for reasons I discuss in the next section, the weapon 
might be double-edged. 
 
 5. Conclusion: The Dialectical Situation 
 
Let me take stock. Luminists typically argue that (MAR) cannot be derived from plausible 
premises: either it requires an overly strong safety condition, or it requires additional 
soritical premises. I’ve offered a reconstruction of Williamson’s two-part defence of 
(MAR), the first intended to work on the assumption that there is no constitutive 
connection between the doxastic and the phenomenal, and the second intended to work 
without even without that assumption. In each case I’ve argued that an independently 
plausible safety condition – (BELIEF-SAFETY) and (CONFIDENCE-SAFETY), 
respectively – combined with an independently plausible view of our empirical characters, 
yields (MAR). In brief, our coarse-grained dispositions to believe renders us incapable of 
 25 
knowing that we are in liminal cases of (otherwise luminous) conditions. This is plausibly 
true whether or not there exists a constitutive connection between the phenomenal and 
the doxastic, at least assuming that such a connection preserves the status of self-
knowledge as an instance of knowledge more generally. Thus the luminist who wants to 
dig in his heels either must reject a plausible picture of our empirical character, or isolate 
self-knowledge as a sui generis epistemic category. I want to end by saying something about 
these two possible retreats for the luminist, and how they figure in the overall dialectical 
situation at hand. 
 
The first possible retreat for the luminist is to reject what I claim is a plausible empirical 
characterisation of the kinds of creatures we are, namely creatures who have certain coarse-
grained dispositions to believe. But some luminists, in arguing against Williamson, seem to 
think that it is sufficient to show merely that some metaphysically possible creature could 
have a different empirical character, and thus enjoy luminosity (Berker 2008, cf. 
Weatherson 2004, p. 9). Williamson himself is not maximally explicit about the conditions 
to which his anti-luminosity argument applies: conditions that human and human-like 
creatures actually find themselves in, conditions that are metaphysically possible, 
conditions that are logically possible?38 But to think the anti-luminosity debate is about 
possible creatures, not creatures like us, is to mistake the dialectical situation. If the anti-
luminosity argument were meant to apply to all possible creatures, we need nothing very 
much to show it to be impotent. For the anti-luminosity argument is trivially compatible 
with various possible creatures for whom feeling cold and a whole range of other 
conditions are luminous39. More significantly, the question of whether we are luminous is 
the question we should care about. The possibility of creatures, perhaps radically different 
from ourselves, for whom interesting conditions are luminous does little to assuage the 
live possibility that our philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics are all built on 
disreputable Cartesian foundations. 
 
                                                        
38 Somewhat gnomically, Williamson writes, prefacing the anti-luminosity argument: “The domain 
of cases will be taken to include counterfactual as well as actual possibilities. Since the cases on 
which the arguments below rely are physically and psychologically feasible, issues about the bounds 
of possibility are not pressing” (2000, p. 94). I take this to mean that Williamson intends Cold 
Morning to be a description of something that is ‘physically and psychologically feasible’ for a 
creature like us. 
39 See ff. 10. 
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The second possible retreat for the luminist is to endorse a particular kind of constitutive 
connection view. While a variety of non-perceptual accounts of self-knowledge are 
compatible with there being a constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the 
doxastic40, according to one such popular account, self-knowledge is deeply disanalogous 
with knowledge of the external world – a conceptual truth, perhaps, or a feature of our 
‘grammar’ in the Wittgensteinan sense of that term (Shoemaker 1986; Wright 1989 and 
1998; Bilgrami 2006; Heal 2001; Coliva 2009). It is sometimes thus said to be ‘no cognitive 
achievement’. Such a view isolates self-knowledge as a sui generis epistemic state, thus 
freeing it from the normal requirements for knowledge like reliability or truth-tracking. 
Obviously, whether this offers a legitimate retreat for the luminist depends on whether the 
phenomenal and the doxastic are really connected in just this way – whether self-
knowledge is really just a conceptual or grammatical upshot. Again, this is in part an 
empirical question about the kinds of creatures we are. I don’t mean to enter this debate. 
But I will close with two observations about it. 
 
The first is that those philosophers of mind who endorse constitutive accounts of self-
knowledge are often motivated to do so precisely because they wish to vindicate luminosity 
of the mental. Thus Berker misrepresents the dialectical situation somewhat when he 
claims that 
 
typically it is precisely because they think that there is a tight connection between 
certain mental states and beliefs about those states that some philosophers 
claim the mental states in question to be luminous (2008, p. 9)41. 
 
That some philosophers favour constitutive accounts does not make luminosity more 
plausible, since it is for the vindication of luminosity that these accounts were generally 
designed42. My second point is this. The tension between Williamson’s anti-luminosity 
argument and the ‘no cognitive achievement’ view of self-knowledge is deep and 
                                                        
40 See e.g. Chalmers (2003) and various essays in Coliva (2012). 
41 Cf. Ramachandran (666). 
42 Of course it might turn out that these accounts, initially motivated by the appeal of luminosity, 
then turn out to have other theoretical virtues (elegance, fecundity, etc.) and thus support the 
original datum of luminosity. But then the luminist would need to do more than simply point out 
that various philosophers endorse a view of the phenomenal as constitutively connected to the 
doxastic; he would have to show why these accounts recommend themselves independently of 
luminosity considerations. Thanks to Jane Friedman for raising this point. 
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fundamental. On Williamson’s view, any knowledge worth the name evinces some sort of 
cognitive achievement. Obviously, fans of the ‘no cognitive achievement’ view of self-
knowledge disagree. But the disagreement here might seem not substantive so much as 
terminological. In one sense, Williamson has nothing to say to this species of luminist43; in 
another, they have already conceded his central point. To the extent that luminists want to 
conceive of self-knowledge as an instance of knowledge more generally, the anti-
luminosity argument puts pressure on them to abandon luminosity. To the extent that 
luminists want to preserve luminosity, they are under pressure to accept a different picture 
of what knowledge itself is. 
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43 I don’t mean this literally: Williamson gestures in Knowledge and its Limits to other arguments 
against these kind of views of self-knowledge. But the anti-luminosity argument itself might not 
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